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Abstract  A free daily newspaper distributes news to readers and sells ad-space to 
advertisers, having private information about its audience. For a given number of 
distributed copies, depending on the type of audience (favorable or unfavorable), the 
newspaper may either have a large readership or a small readership. A large 
readership provides a greater return to advertisers, because ads are visualized by 
more people. A favorable audience has also the advantage of requiring a lower 
distribution cost (for a given number of distributed copies), because readers are 
willing to exert more effort to obtain a copy of the free newspaper and are less likely 
to reject a copy that is handed to them. We find that when the audience is unfavorable, 
the number of distributed copies and the price of ad-space coincide with those of the 
perfect information scenario. In contrast, if the audience is favorable, the newspaper 
prints extra copies to send a credible signal to the advertisers that the audience is 
favorable. Overprinting is not necessarily welfare-detrimental since readers benefit 
from the existence of additional copies. 
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